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Peace and Compromise, Idealism and Constraint: The Case of the
Arusha Peace Accords in Rwanda and Burundi
Jonathan Beloff

SOAS University of London
London, England

Samantha Lakin

Clark University
Worcester, Massachusetts, USA

Peace and stability have been core challenges in the Great Lakes Region of Africa since the years
of independence from European nations. State building processes have been ridden by ongoing
violence, characterized by two-sided or multi-party violence perpetrated by militias, national
militaries, rogue groups, and even local civilians. The international system has prioritized peace
accords and negotiation processes when parties in conflict decide to move past the violence, either
required by external actors, or based on the unsustainability of the situation on the ground. When
warring parties and international actors sign peace accords to end conflict in an attempt to begin
political dialogue, they often reinforce the international legal assumption that these negotiations
will bring about positive change, including peace and stability. The cases of Rwanda and Burundi
are complicated, with social, historical, political, ideological, and economic factors leading to
violence on the ground. The Arusha Accords of 1993 in Rwanda and of 2000 in Burundi were
followed only by short-term stability, with an eventual return to conflict. This study examines the
effects of the Arusha Peace Accords signed prior to the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, and the Arusha
Accords of 2000, which ended 12 years of civil war in Burundi. As shown in this paper and through
our research, peace negotiations and peace processes take place in an unideal situation, yet in order
for future peace to be achieved they must be attempted. The failure of Arusha in Rwanda and in
Burundi show some of the complexities and challenges faced in these two case studies, and analyze
why there was a return to violence in each case.
Methodology
The research on Rwanda’s history and lasting effects of the 1993 Arusha Accords stems from
existing scholarly literature as well as qualitative interview and observational data gathered during
research periods in Rwanda. Beginning in 2008 until 2016, semi-structured interviews have been
conducted with named and anonymous elite Rwandan officials involved in the negotiation of
the accords as well as rebuilding the country after the 1994 genocide, also referred to as the 1994
Genocide Against the Tutsis. While interviewing Rwandan Government officials is controversial,1
their role in the negotiation or reconstruction of Rwanda after the Arusha Accords provides unique
insights and illustrates their perceptions of Arusha’s effects on Rwanda. Some informants were
willing to have their names attached to their statements while others, mostly mid-level officials,
requested their statements be recorded, but not identified. Many explained their desire for their
names to be withheld stemmed from fear of possible loss of employment from the government
as some views might be considered controversial. Some Rwandan civilians working for genocide
remembrance institutions also requested their names be withheld. The information was analyzed
through triangulation methods to uncover major themes and Rwandan perceptions of the short
and long-term effects of the accord. For the comparative research on Burundi and the 2000
Arusha Accords, the authors have conducted a robust review of secondary literature, and have
also reviewed primary source newspaper articles, United Nations and African Union reports, and
independent commission and governmental reports, since April 2015. In addition, interviews were
conducted in June 2015, December 2016, and June 2016 with Burundian refugee leaders, including
opposition members living in Rwanda, Europe, and the United States. As it was impossible to enter
Burundi to conduct the research due to the lack of openness, security risks, and suspicion of foreign
1
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researchers, we were unable to interview leaders of the current Nkurunziza regime. Therefore, the
analysis of the governmental perspective is based on a review of secondary and primary source
documents and reports collected by the researchers.
Case Situation within the Literature on Peace Negotiations and Compromise
It is important to consider how existing literature about peace negotiations and compromise
elucidate the challenges inherent to and created during peace negotiations, specifically in complex
and violent humanitarian emergencies with less than ideal realities on the ground. “On Complicity
and Compromise” by Lepora and Goodin provides a significant example of a humanitarian doctor
who is asked in the midst of conflict in a war-torn country if a militia soldier should use condoms
when he rapes a woman. The humanitarian doctor told the young soldier, “Yes.” However, the
ethicist (Lepora) responds by questioning whether the doctor gave the right answer, and if she was
somehow complicit in “any rape the soldier would perpetrate in the future?”2 This dilemma shows
how reality in situations like the Arusha negotiations in pre-genocide Rwanda and those peace
negotiations among the ongoing atrocities in Burundi complicate the ability to make moral choices
in situations that are far less than ideal. Of the book, Hugo Slim says, “in such settings, when we
cannot stop wider wrongs, some level of complicity may be unavoidable, even desirable, so as to
secure the limited moral goods that we can achieve. Still, such decisions always leave us with an
aching sense of moral distress.”3
The book addresses the relevant theme of complicity as political rhetoric, yet this article shows
that the political sphere where the Arusha negotiations took place had real impacts on the lives of
Rwandans, Burundians, and refugees in the region. According to “A post-liberal peace” edited by
Oliver P. Richmond,4
Liberal peacebuilding has caused a range of unintended consequences. These emerge from
the liberal peace’s internal contradictions, from its claim to offer a universal normative and
epistemological basis for peace, and to offer a technology and process which can be applied
to achieve it. When viewed from a range of contextual and local perspectives, these topdown and distant processes often appear to represent power rather than humanitarianism
or emancipation.

The point is that oftentimes these top-down processes lack a real connection with the lived
experiences and realities of people on the ground. This was especially the case in Rwanda in
1993, when the Arusha negotiations were taking place, but neither Habyiramana’s regime nor
the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) truly trusted the process. Tutsis were still being killed on the
ground and fear was rampant. In addition, while the RPF integrated into the government, they
also continued to prepare militarily, in case Arusha fell through. This shows alternatives created
by local groups, as Richmond and his colleagues state, occurring parallel to the official, top-down
processes. Lastly, however, top-down processes in the Rwandan and Burundian cases are not black
and white, as the liberation movements consisted of leaders who were refugees, trained in local
situations, operating on the ground and not in traditional political spaces. The divulgence and
mélange of the formal and informal, the elite and local become mixed and confused in these cases,
a point to be addressed when discussing peace negotiations in Rwanda and Burundi.
The Road to Arusha: Brief Histories of post-independence Rwanda and Burundi
Rwanda received independence from Belgian colonial rule on July 1, 1962. Ethnic history in Rwanda
began with German (1884-1926) and then Belgian (1926-1962) colonization as these colonial states
converted previous socio-economic divisions within the country into ethnic identities with the
minority Tutsi (15 percent of the total population) dominating over the majority Hutu population
2

Hugo Slim, review of On Complicity and Compromise, by Chiara Lepora and Robert E. Goodin, Ethics & International
Affairs 27, no. 4 (2014).

3

Slim, On Complicity.

4

Oliver Richmond, A Post-Liberal Peace (London: Routledge, 2012), 1-21.
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(84 percent of the total population) as well as the relative few Twa residence population (only
composing 1 percent of the total population).5 Ethnic dominance was transferred away from Tutsis
to Hutus during independence with the development of an extremist Hutu counter-elite that
gained control of government in 1959 with the development of the PARMEUTU political party.
Thousands of Rwandan Tutsis fled into neighboring countries. Pogroms, massacres, and forced
immigration of mostly Tutsis led to an estimated 120,000 Rwandans to flee from Rwanda. Many
of their children would later create the Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF), which would ignite the
Rwandan Civil War (1990-1994), enter negotiations and accept the terms of the Arusha Accords
(1993), end the Rwandan Genocide (1994), and dominate the current Rwandan government.
During the early years of the exile, many refugees hoped for international involvement to solve
their status by applying pressure on the post-independence government of Grégoire Kayibanda
(1962-1973). However, the international community abandoned the refugee cause with the
disappointment of the United Nations becoming a norm. From our interviews, Rwandan refugees
illustrated the distrust and feeling of abandonment by the United Nations by using the United
Nations as a type of lullaby sung to children. They would even call a lazy person ‘someone who
works for the UN.’6 With international abandonment being accepted as the norm, many Rwandan
refugees crafted ideologies to fit alongside the desire to return.
The establishment of the Rwanda’s Alliance for National Unity (RANU), which later became
the RPF, crafted the Eight-Point-Programme that called for a “one Rwanda” ideology rather than
a nation of ethnic divisionism.7 The refugees’ desire to return to Rwanda led to the Rwandan Civil
War beginning on October 1, 1990 with the RPF’s military wing, the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA)
invading the country from its Ugandan border.8 The initial invasion failed with a combination
of French intervention and the death of RPA leader, General Fred Rwigyema.9 With the failed
invasion, the RPA were able to recuperate after moving into the Virunga Volcano forest, which
was adjacent to the politically influential city of Musanze. The city was at the heart of President
Juvenal Habyarimana’s political base. On January 24, 1991, the RPA raided Musanze for military
equipment, food, as well as freeing political dissidents held in the city’s jails.10 The main goal of the
surprise attack was the desire to showcase to the Habyarimana regime as well as the international
community that the RPF was not defeated after the failed first invasion attempt and was going to
continue to fight for the right of return for Rwandan refugees.
International pressure from Uganda, Belgium, United Kingdom, United States, and even
Habyarimana’s European ally of France, forced the Rwandan government to begin negotiations
with the RPF on August 10, 1992.11 Negotiations originally were initiated by political opposition
parties of Habyarimana, the Democratic Republican Movement (MDR), Social Democratic Party
(PSD) and the Liberal Party (PL), the government eventually took part.12 As the Habyarimana
regime began serious negotiations with the RPF, the initial parties were sidelined as they could
not enforce any concessions given to the RPF. Negotiations were difficult as the RPF demanded for

5

Stephen Kinzer, A Thousand Hills, Rwanda’s Rebirth and the Man Who Dreamed It (Hoboken: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2008),
24; Gerard Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis: History of a Genocide (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), 5-9.

6
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72-75, 81; Frank Rusagara, “The Spread of the ‘Genocide Ideology’ Within the Great Lakes Region: Challenges for
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Patrick Noack (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 187.
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Front (Jefferson: McFarland & Company, Inc., 2004), 46-47.
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their inclusion in the government by being appointed ministers for five government institutions
such as the Ministry of Youth and Culture and the Ministry of the Interior; composing of 40 percent
of the Rwandan Armed Forces (FAR) both in terms of ground soldiers and officers; removal of
French soldiers from Rwanda; implementation of a right of return for Rwandan refugees; ethnic
labels removed from national identity cards as well as free elections after a twenty-two month
period.13 Participants from extremists parties such as the Coalition for the Defence of the Republic
(CDR) rejected multiple debated topics as well as continual negotiations with the Tutsi RPF.
However, many RPF delegates such as Pasteur Bizimungu, Theogene Rudasingwas and Patrick
Mazimpaka and Tito Rutaremara persisted in achieving their desired goals. Rutaremara recounts
a major difficulty experienced during the negotiations. He describes how many of Habyarimana’s
representatives seemingly had little interest in negotiating, but rather to engage in other recreational
activities. He illustrates this by describing what each party did after a day’s negotiations:
The government of Rwanda (Habyarimana’s delegates) would go drinking or partying after
the day’s negotiation. The RPF (delegates) instead would return to their rooms and work
together on writing papers and notes of the day’s events as well as new negotiating points
that they wanted to discuss the next day. This added the RPF’s negotiations, because when
the government of Rwanda would complain and disagree, the RPF would demand to see
their plans in writings, which they never had!14

Despite difficulties, the Habyarimana government accepted a peace deal (Arusha Accord) that
would keep Habyarimana as President with his political party, the National Republican Movement
for Democracy and Development (MRND(D)), maintaining significant government positions, but
their power would be diminished and shared. More importantly, the RPF was able to achieve
nearly all of their demands.
The Arusha Accord was finally signed on August 4, 1993 after renewed pressure on the
Habyarimana regime by a return to fighting by the RPF15 in January 1992.16 The peace agreement
introduced a sense of relief for many who believed that ethnic conflict, whether between major
actors such as the Rwandan Government and the RPF or more general such as Rwandan Hutus and
Tutsi, would reduce and not lead to a larger mass murder. One Rwandan civilian accused of being
an RPF spy in Kigali commented, “we thought the war was done. We (living in Kenya after the
1992 fighting) returned home thinking that Rwanda moved from its killing. There was such a sense
of hope for tomorrow.”17 For civilians wanting an end to the violence, the agreement indicated
possible peace and preventing future massacres. While few would predict a genocide erupting if
conflict continued, there was a sense that the Arusha Accords prevented the nation from slipping
into chaos. For many within the RPF, this was a sign of victory of their quest for the right of return
for Rwandan refugees as well as transforming Rwandan society into their ‘one Rwanda’ ideology.
Many RPF and former RPA officials viewed the accord as a great victory at the time and believed
that with the inclusion of a United Nations peacekeeping force, United Nations Assistance Mission
in Rwanda (UNAMIR), the international community would no longer abandon Rwanda and its
refugees.
However, upon later reflection, many within the current Rwandan Government acknowledge
that the accords would not be enough to prevent the impending genocide. One Rwanda Defense
Force18 (RDF) commander reflected on Arusha, “we thought we had won, because we got
everything we asked for! It was a dream, but looking back now, we know it was useless.”19 His

13

Kinzer, A Thousand Hills, 107-108.
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Tito Rutaremara (Rwandan Senator) in discussion with Jonathan Beloff, August 27, 2014.
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The RPF broke the previously agreed cease-fire after 300 Rwandans were killed by Hutu extremists.

16

Melvern, A People Betrayed, 49, 62-63; Prunier, Rwanda Crisis, 174.
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Unnamed Rwandan (retired office worker) in discussion with Jonathan Beloff, June 2012.
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In 2002, the Rwanda Patriotic Army changed its name to the Rwanda Defence Force.
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Unnamed Rwandan (military official) in discussion with Jonathan Beloff, November 2014.

©2019

Genocide Studies and Prevention 13, no. 2 https://doi.org/10.5038/1911-9933.13.2.1696

Peace and Compromise, Idealism and Constraint

133

reflection was similar to Rutaremara’s who heard at the end of the signing of the accord’s Rwandan
military commander Colonel Theoneste Bagasora’s infamous words of, “preparing the second
apocalypse.”20 Bagasora’s comments were a direct reference to the preparation of the upcoming
genocide that took place only nine months later. Reyntjens,21 Prunier,22 and Guichaoua23 question
RPF commitment to the accords as it was unlikely the RPF could win a majority in an election,
as many Rwandans feared or held negative opinions of the RPF. Thus, only through military
means could the RPF take control over the government. Dallaire24 dismissed this assumption by
stating how the RPF was in full support of the accord. The Arusha Accords might have brought
a temporary peace and prospects of the end of the ethnic conflict. However, it only provided the
space and timing for genocidaires to prepare for their massacres. The failures of the accord would
affect how the RPF would perceive international engagement and corporation.
The history and culture of Rwanda and Burundi are inexorably linked, and the violence of the
1990s through the present is often treated as having stemmed from the same problems. However,
post-independence violence and ethnic ideology developed differently in Rwanda and Burundi.25
At the time of independence, also in July 1, 1962, the Burundian population was composed of a
similar ethnic makeup as Rwanda, 84 percent of the total population were identified as Hutu, 15
percent as Tutsi, and less than 1 percent as Twa.26 Popular assumption implies the patterns of and
rationale for violence in both countries were virtually the same. However, in Rwanda, policies of
ethnic divisionism fuelled conflict, whereas in Burundi, the suppression of ethnic identity led to a
state of fear and uncertainty, leading to conflict there, as well.
Scholars, including Prunier,27 Fujii,28 Straus and Waldorf,29 Uvin,30 Lemarchand,31 David and
Catherine Newbury,32 and Ndikumana33 address the history and salience of ethnicity in Rwanda
and Burundi, in addition to themes of ethnicization of politics, institutional capacity, and historical
memory as factors that impacted violence in both countries. After independence, unlike in Rwanda,
the monarchy in Burundi survived, resulting in a bi-ethnic party, UPRONA (Union Pour Progrès
National), led by Prince Louis Rwagasore, who was elected after independence. Rwagasore was
assassinated in October 1961, thus thrusting the political party toward internal conflict. Fighting
for control of the state took place between the Tutsi-Hima, Tutsi-Banyaruguru, and a small
emerging Hutu elite, where the Tutsi-Hima emerged successfully. In addition, following the Social
Revolution in Rwanda, state control became the sole vehicle for Tutsi to retain their privileges in
Burundi. Instead of the reinforcement of a single-ethnic country, as in Rwanda after independence,
Burundian elites officially stated that ethnicity was not as important as other social factors, but
underneath the official rhetoric the structural violence of ethnic identity and ethnic clientship
remained.
Differences in ethnic divisions fueled competition for state power in Rwanda and Burundi, yet
leadership differed in the two. Both countries sought a small elite backed by military support to
20
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Press, 2015), 67-76.
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control the rest of the population. In Rwanda, it was the Hutu counter-elite; in Burundi it was the
Tutsi elite, which garnered support from both Hutu and Tutsi citizens post-independence.
The Rwandan independence revolution, which elected Gregoire Kayibanda and the
PARMEHUTU extremist regime, caused fear in Burundi, where both ethnic groups felt they needed
to gain power at the other’s expense. Political and ethnic groups were concerned about the conflict
between Hutu and Tutsi taking place in Rwanda, and ethnic solidarity seemed too idealistic.
This was a divorce from the rhetoric of ethnic solidarity and unity that had taken place before in
Burundi, during the time of Price Rwagasore. Displaced Tutsi refugees arrived in Burundi from
northern Rwanda and caused heightened mistrust and unease between Hutus and Tutsis. From
1965-1973, two-sided violence continued between Hutu and Tutsi political parties that trickled
down to local violence among people of differing ethnicities. This stemmed from fear in the region,
and knowledge of the impact that Hutu extremist rule had on Rwandan society.34
The Kayibanda and Habyiramana regimes created conflict by forming strong central
governments that were highly ethnicized, which promoted hate propaganda against the Tutsi.
These regimes made ethnicity the most important identity marker in terms of economic, social,
and political opportunities in the country.35 In Burundi, the idea of oneness was reinforced among
Burundian leaders, even though political elites practiced ethnic discrimination. Therefore, ethnicity
existed and was salient, but ethnic affiliation was silenced to promote an air of social cohesion.
According to Ndikumana, political elites in Burundi tell “half-truths”36 to the public about the
causes and continuation of the massacres and conflict.37 This stems from an unequal distribution of
power along ethnic lines, with minority Tutsi leadership in a majority Hutu country.
While discussion of ethnicity was stifled in Burundi for many years during Tutsi military
coups from 1963-1993, after the assassination of Melchior Ndadaye in 1993, the country’s first
Hutu leader, ethnicity became a salient factor in political discussions.38 The resulting imbalance of
power initiated by the colonial regime, Ndikumana says, has been maintained by the post-colonial
governments in Burundi, and is an important cause of the violence that has existed in Burundi
since the 1960s.
Rwanda and Burundi have different processes of ethnicization of politics, which have
developed in reaction to initial ethnic policies and violent regimes in the two countries. In Burundi,
although the importance of ethnicity is felt and grievances against the violence committed by “the
other” is present in the minds of Burundians, there is nearly no forum to openly discuss violence of
Hutus toward Tutsi, and violence of Tutsi toward Hutu. The Burundian government has sponsored
propaganda in different spaces, including in the media and in academic institutions, to blame
ethnicity on colonial imperialism. The propaganda also states that ethnic identity should not
matter, and was a plot of the colonialists to create conflict in the country, to keep the Burundians
repressed. According to the Burundian government, discussing ethnicity was deemed as a threat
to national security.39
In addition, perception of the other and the neighboring country’s struggles influenced the
ethnicization of politics and how the main government acted. Tutsi leaders in Burundi used the
example of massacres and violence in Rwanda leaders to develop a widespread fear of Hutu
extremism among citizens of Burundi. This also resulted in anti-Hutu violence as fear escalated
and desire to control the political situation and ensure Tutsi safety grew.
While ethnicization of politics stemmed from colonial focus on ethnic divisions, elites from
both ethnicities in Rwanda and Burundi continued this system to wield power in their favor. The
conflict over power affected nearly all citizens in both countries, and also perpetuated myths and
Ravi Bhavnani and David Backer, “Localized Ethnic Conflict and Genocide Accounting for Differences in Rwanda and
Burundi,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 44, no. 3 (2000), 283-306.
35
Scott Straus, The Order of Genocide: Race, Power, and War in Rwanda (Ithaca: Cornell University Press: 2006).
36
Ndikumana, Institutional Failure, 29-47.
37
Ibid.
38
Villia Jefremovas, “Treacherous waters: the politics of history and the politics of genocide in Rwanda and Burundi,”
Africa 70, no. 2 (2000), 298-308.
39
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propaganda about “the other.” In Rwanda, this was primarily used by Hutu extremist government,
targeted at Tutsi citizens inside the country and the RPA/RPF Tutsi refugees in Uganda. In Burundi,
however, the power and ethnicization of politics takes on a two-sided role. According to Uvin:
From 1966 to 1993 political and by extension economic power in Burundi was tightly held
by three military regimes (Micombero, 1966-82, Bagaza, 1982-87, Buyoya 1987-93) that used
their military might to keep their privileges. All three presidents were Tutsi-Hima from the
same village in the Bururi region, born within two miles of each other.40

At the assassination of the first democratically elected Hutu President of Burundi, Melchior
Ndadaye in October 1993, civil war broke out and the situation in Burundi deteriorated into total
violence.41 During the civil war, Hutu lived in constant fear of revenge violence by the army and
the militia after the massacres of 1972. Hate propaganda was a prominent form of inciting and
motivating violence. According to Uvin, The Hutu inhabitants of Bujumbura, the capital, have
largely been chased out of the city due to a policy reminiscent of the “ethnic cleansing” in the
former Yugoslavia.42
The end of the civil war in Burundi concluded on August 28, 2000, when Burundian political
parties signed the “Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi” (the Arusha
Agreement) under the South African President Nelson Mandela, the negotiator of the Accords,
although, like in Rwanda in 1993, violence was still occurring on the ground. According to the
International Crisis Group:
The agreement was not really a peace agreement: it was a deal between the government
and political parties, and it urged armed groups, which did not initially sign it, to suspend
hostilities and negotiate a ceasefire. It was a manifesto for a possible return to peace, including
long passages on how to reorganize the security forces, which had been responsible for much
of the violence in the 1990s. It included a commitment to tackle the conflict’s root causes,
which the agreement presciently noted were “fundamentally political” and “stem from a
struggle by the political class to accede to and/or remain in power.”43

The Arusha Accords attempted to address two main issues, first guaranteeing political parity
and full participation by the Tutsi minority and Hutu majority, and second how to rebuild trust of
Hutu majorities in the armed forces.44 This resulted in four main agenda items: 1. A power sharing
formula was created based on minority over-representation and coalition-building; 2. Protocols
provided for the equitable participation of all parties in the three branches of government and in
all national institutions including state-owned corporations; 3. Constitutional checks to discourage
the concentration of power by a single party or group of aligned parties; 4. Modalities to integrate
former enemies into a more representative military.45 As a result, these provisions were written
into Burundi’s constitution. Accordingly, no single ethnic group holds more than 50 percent of the
defense and security forces. Similarly, no ethnic group holds more than 67 percent of local, county
and municipal positions. However ideal the power-sharing agreement was, as ethnicity remained
central to the identities of those in power, the failure of Arusha was partly due to the continuation
of identity-based politics, including entitlement and exploitation of local civilians, the military, the
40
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judiciary, and other politicians along in-group lines. Despite a well-designed structure, over time,
the pervasiveness of identity-based politics allowed for abuse of power and an ultimate return to
violence by calling upon and reviving these same factors that aimed to protect the population from
such violence in the first place.
Revolutionary Rapprochement: Non-state Movements and Arusha
Arusha Arises in Rwanda
The failure of the 1993 Arusha Accord in Rwanda is perhaps most understood by the onset of the
1994 genocide. There were multiple events before, during, and after the genocide that signaled the
accords were unable to help fulfill its intensions. Prior to the genocide, the Habyarimana regime
increased in political space in July 1991, as a response to economic recession, international pressure,
and the RPF.46 It was not the RPF that sparked the initial challenge to Habyarimana’s rule, but rather
economic factors. The decline of tea and coffee prices, the main exports of Rwanda, forced the
government to ask for additional loans and increases in foreign aid and debt forgiveness. French
President, François Mitterrand, the United States, and other Western nations pressed African
countries, including Rwanda, to open their political space in return for continual or increased
assistance.47 This international call was coupled with an increase in domestic pressure with tens of
thousands protesting Habyarimana’s one-party rule in January 1992.48 Scholars such as Prunier,49
Kimonyo,50 Melvern,51 Guichaoua,52 and others write extensively of how the opening of political
space provided the foundations for Hutu extremists parties such as the CDR in 1992 alongside with
the extremist elements of Habyarimana’s MRND(D) to thrive and garner support. The opening
of political space leading to Hutu extremism influenced RPF leaders after the genocide to restrict
political space in order not to permit renewed extremism. The Arusha Accords, while continuing
to open political space, also granted the environment for Hutu extremist parties to prepare for
the immediate days after the start of the genocide by overthrowing the transitional government
headed by Prime Minister Agatha Uwilingiyimana53 and forcing other political moderates such as
Faustin Twagiramungu and Seth Sendashonga to flee into UNAMIR protected zones. These events
influenced RPF officials after the genocide to restrict public space in order to prevent a repetition
of the accord’s unintentional allowance of space for extremists.
While the Arusha Accords began to fail prior to the genocide, its ultimate failure was the
prevention of a continuation of the Rwandan Civil War and genocide. Most notable is how the
accord seemed to foster genocide ideology by granting it the space to thrive through weakening
the current structures that promoted a less, but still extreme, prejudice against the Rwandan Tutsi
population. The assassination of Habyarimana on 6 April, 1994 by some unknown force triggered
the beginning of the genocide.54 While some such as Reyntjens55 believe the RPF to be responsible for
the assassination, it seems much more probable the attack was committed by the Hutu extremists’
groups angry at Habyarimana for agreeing to the accord and fearing its full implementation.56 The
ultimate failure of the accord is best summarized with RPA leader, General Paul Kagame refusing
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to negotiate with the interim-government, who were conducting the genocide, until they ended
the massacres and instead deciding to disregard the accord and restart the war to force them out of
power.57 The justifiable causes of Kagame’s desire not to hold dialogue stemmed from the agaciro
belief that only through self-responsibility and self-reliance, especially on the part of the interim
government, could the genocide end.
Humanitarian intervention was minimal during most of the genocide. At the beginning of
the genocide, UNAMIR commander General Roméo Dallaire had only 2,548 troops to try to stop
the massacres and save civilians. However, this number decreased to only 270 on April 21, after
UN Security Council passed Resolution 912 to minimize UNAMIR’s capabilities.58 Following the
collapse of the Arusha Accords, Rwanda was abandoned by the international community and
between 800,000 to one million Rwandan Tutsi and moderate Hutus died between April 6 to July 19,
1994. The genocide was a major turning point in how the RPF viewed domestic and international
engagement.
Little of the pre-genocide multiparty government remained. The RPF political delegates
bunkered at the Parliament building in Kigali survived because of the protection of 600 stationed
RPA soldiers.59 Within the first three days of the genocide, Hutu extremists targeted and assassinated
oppositional political leaders. Some members had survived such as Faustin Twagiramungu, but
most other political officials were killed.60 Despite a lack of political leaders and the introduced ban
on the CDR and MRND(D), the RPF, who were the only surviving political organization and whose
armed wing ended the genocide, brought back the Arusha Accord as the central legal doctrine
alongside the previous 1991 Constitution. On July 19, the new post-genocide government was
sworn in with much of the accord being implemented. However, there were two major differences.
As Prunier describes: first, political seats designated to the now banned political parties were
taken by the RPF.61 However, this was quickly criticized by the remaining parties. Thus, each of
the political parties received either one or two additional ministerial seats. Second, the President
and the newly created Vice-Presidential positions were created and filled by RPF officials, Pasteur
Bizimungu and Paul Kagame respectively. However, the lack of developed opposition parties
allowed the RPF to cement its current rule over Rwanda.
The new implementation of the Arusha Accords faced serious problems and seemingly ended
within two years after the genocide. While it no longer provided the space for Hutu extremists
to develop and conduct genocide, it did not establish a continual Rwandan Government with
functioning and diverse political parties. The intended political outcomes from the Arusha
Accords was short lived. The broad government consisting of the RPF and other moderate parties
quickly collapsed as many non-RPF Government officials felt that they were being by-passed
by RPF members for new government positions. Additional claims of harassment by RPF and
Tutsi officials against non RPF or Hutu Government officials led to many leaving the transitional
government.62 This indicates how RPF leaders were attempting to form a government run solely
by RPF members. This assessment contradicts Gribbin’s experiences working in Rwanda where
he states of Bizimungu and Kagame’s desire to fulfill the accord.63 The Kibeho massacre, which
witnessed an estimated 500064 predominately Hutu civilians massacred by RPA forces on April 22,
1995, was the end for the accord’s desire of a multiethnic and multi-party government.65 It resulted
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in the resignation of Prime Minister Faustin Twagiramungu, Interior Minister Seth Sendashonga
(one of the few RPF Hutu members) and Justice Minister Alphonse Nkubito in August 1995.66 The
Arusha Accord would be replaced with a RPF-dominated Rwandan government with the RPF
believing that negotiating and cooperating with domestic and foreign actors unwise. Rather, it
alone needed to lead the state in its social, political and economic development in order not to
repeat the events that led to the genocide.
Arusha Arises in Burundi
The strategy of the main mediator for the Arusha Accords in Burundi, Nelson Mandela, was
similar to that in Rwanda, where the RPF, as a liberation party was engaged throughout the Arusha
process, with the goal of being integrated into the political system as an official political party.
Mandela’s decision to reengage the more moderate of extremist parties in Burundi, the CNDD.
Although the CNDD did not take part in the drafting of the Arusha accord, during the Arusha
negotiations the CNDD was led by Leonard Nyangoma. However, the CNDD fractured into two;
thus, the creation of the CNDD-FDD by a faction of CNDD Nkurunziza after Arusha. Bringing
in the CNDD, though, helped bring the spoilers to the negotiating table, ultimately resulting in
an accord that was acceptable and passable for all parties involved. However, in the process of
reengagement, the limitations of the CNDD became apparent. Unlike the RPF, they were not a
liberation movement, and they lacked a coherent ideology for political advancement, leadership,
and gain making. According to an interview with a regional expert on Peace and Security, working
on issues in Burundi, “Liberation movements lacking a clear ideology often flip-flop and have
trouble saying what they desire. They can be more of a liability if they don’t have a clear vision or
ideology.”67 Yet, they used extremist tactics to undermine the process and threaten the Burundian
population. According to the United States Government Definition of Violent Extremism, two
components must be present: 1) methods of violence, and 2) ideology. Lacking ideology was a
major weakness of the movement turned party. Mandela’s team saw this, and he used the strategy
of approaching these non-violent extremists as a way to engage and secure the CNDD during the
negotiations.
Since Arusha, the newly formed CNDD-FDD has used a calculus of threat, morphing from
a movement that seemed interested in reintegrating into the international community, to a
radicalized party. It rests on tenets of the neocolonial narrative in Burundi, a narrative that is antiWestern, anti-African Union, and anti-ICC, where its calculus of threat and calculus of survival is
operating more on a survival basis rather than a long-term plan.
The CNDD was a movement formed after the assassination of Melchior Ndadaye in 1993,
who was the first democratically elected Hutu president in Burundi. Originally, the CNDD-FDD
was based on goals to rid the military and intellectual society of Hutu intellectuals and military
leaders, in the 1960s and 1970s. However, over time and after the failed Hutu coup and subsequent
violence against Hutu citizens in Burundi in 1972, the CNDD-FDD lost its ideological basis. After
engaging in the Arusha process with mediator Nelson Mandela, the CNDD-FDD, now as an
official political party, won elections in 2005 according to the power-sharing outcomes and ideals
of the Arusha accords.68 However, the pretense of a multi-ethnic movement changed over time,
as well, and deteriorated after the 2010 and 2015 elections, when ethnic rhetoric and violence had
been wielded against the citizenry, in a clear abandonment of Arusha’s principles, thus, throwing
the country back into daily violence and a mass atrocity situation. This was a calculation of party
survival that undermined the goals of creating a stable political society and arrangement in Burundi
despite ethnic tensions and legacies of two-sided violence.
The Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi had strong accountability
mechanisms. However, the protagonists were keen to secure immunity from prosecution and so
their implementation focused on power-sharing. This has given the government license to mobilize
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against the opposition with little fear of sanction. In the process, the government has been able
to tighten its grip on power.69 Finally, external guarantors of peace agreements often pull back
from the post-conflict context and have been reluctant to hold signatories accountable when they
violate terms of the agreement. Agreements in Burundi provided strong regional and international
monitoring mechanisms. However, these were ultimately not consistently enforced. In Burundi,
regional and international actors opted not to intervene during the run-up to the 2010 elections
after there were clear signs that the situation there was going to deteriorate. The pattern of atrocities
leading up to the 2015 elections was eerily similar, and again, there were no effective deterrents to
such behavior.
How Was Arusha Flawed? Contemplating the Outcomes of the two Arusha Accords in Rwanda
and Burundi
Outcomes of Arusha in Rwanda: Peacekeeping, Ideology, and Ethnicity
The introduction of the 2003 Rwandan Constitution officially ended the Arusha Accord.70 However,
by this time the agreements in the deal were relatively ignored leaving the RPF in near complete
control over the government. One Rwandan discussed the transition from the accord to the new
constitution as, “Arusha gave us failed hope, but at least the RPF tried to implement it after the
genocide. It helped guide us until we were ready to form our Constitution (in 2003).”71 After nearly
twenty-four years from its signing, its legacy can still be seen through how Rwanda perceives and
interacts with the international community. Additionally, the accord’s failed desires for domestic
political transition and preventing international abandonment of civilians has influenced how the
Rwandan government perceives its commitment in peacekeeping. To properly establish Rwandan
perceptions, it is necessary to revisit the RPF’s understanding and expectation of the accord as
well as past engagement with their adversaries, i.e. the Habyarimana regime, and the international
community.
The RPF viewed the Arusha negotiations within its growing understanding of international
order following what can be considered akin to the international relations theory of liberalism. At
liberalism’s core is the expectation that negotiations between leaders can attempt to prevent or stop
certain conflicts and violence that are against universal norms.72 Many within the RPF and the RPA
believed after the attack on Muzanse and the beginning of the Arusha process, that negotiations was
an effective mechanism to achieve their goals.73 The genocide shattered the RPF’s understanding of
the international order operating within liberalism. Most problematic to their usage of liberalism
was, not how negotiations resulted in genocide, but rather how universal norms of human rights
were quickly ignored by the international community. It was only the RPF who put an end to
the genocide with UNAMIR only providing minimal support to safeguard victims. While the
international community historically ignored the plight of Rwandan refugees, mostly Tutsis, and
as Uvin74 writes the situation of domestic Tutsis, international abandonment during the genocide
undermined any belief that the world was concerned about human rights when conflicted with
state security and interest. In response to Rwanda’s abandonment and the RPF’s responsibility, as
the only entity willing to put an end to the massacres,75 realism took center stage as the dominant
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understanding by Rwandan officials of how the international system operates. Realism best
explains why the international community kept supporting President Habyarimana negative
public policies prior to the genocide because his regime was seen by the French government as
part of their nation’s sphere of influence and contained state interests. Senator Rutaremara extends
Habyarimana’s network to the United States. “The Government of Rwanda (Habyarimana regime)
was an ally of France, which was ally of the United States, so why would the US government want
to remove a regime that had great support by France?”76
Manager of the Kigali Genocide Memorial, Honore Gatera described the failures of the Arusha
Accords as leading to the rise in realism;
I think you have to put it (the change by the RPF from a liberalist to realist perception of
international affairs) into perspective. Many of us hoped that Arusha (accord) would work,
but it did not and resulted in so many dead. The world left because (Rwanda) was not in
their (state) interest. So, we realised that the world works based on interests and (the) power
of nations.77

These perceptions follow alongside neoclassical realist writer Hans Morgenthau’s interpretation
of morality in the international community as, “Realism maintains that universal moral principles
cannot be applied to the actions of states in their abstract universal formulation, but that they must
filtered through the concrete circumstance of time and place.”78 The Arusha Accords created a sense
within Rwanda and the RPF of how the international community, which pushed Habyarimana
into negotiations, acceptance and enforcement of the accord, believed in a sense of morality that
included preserving human rights. However, the inactions by the international community to stop
the killings, as seen with the withdrawal of UNAMIR peacekeepers, implanted a perception of how
state interests and power rather than moral consideration exists within the international order.
This reality still holds true for many within the current RPF-dominated Rwandan government.
Despite realism being the dominate theory underlying Rwandan perceptions of the
international system, some liberalism stemming from the Arusha period still persists. The liberal
belief of universal human rights is still held by Rwandan government elites in how they set foreign
policy, including participation in regional and global peacekeeping missions. Rwanda participates
in peacekeeping operations in Central African Republic (CAR), South Sudan, Darfur (Sudan),
Haiti, and Mali, as well as in other conflict zones.79 RDF Chief of Staff, Patrick Nyamvumba,
described the different reasons for why Rwanda participates in peacekeeping missions that
both incorporate elements of realism, but also include past experiences with the failed UNAMIR
mission. He says, “we deploy peacekeepers with three ideas. First, (fostering) peace resolution for
local and regional interests. Most of Rwanda’s peacekeepers are stationed in the region. Second, a
secure environment in the region helps Rwanda. And third, participate because of the international
community as a backdrop.”80 The first reason relates to human rights views held by Rwandan
officials who held similar views during the signing of the accords. The last reason directly relates
to Rwanda’s past experiences and its responsibility to prevent other countries from experiencing
what Rwanda experienced. Both these reasons share a common desire for the protection of human
rights in conflict situations that were previously held by RPF negotiators during the formulation of
the Arusha Accords. The failure of the accord and of the international community to defend these
rights during the genocide influences Rwandan policy makers in how its own military is used in
peacekeeping missions.
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Beswick,81 Fisher,82 Zorbas,83 and Reyntjens84 differ from this explanation of Rwanda’s
participation in peacekeeping. Instead, they comment on how it is a mechanism to gain favor
from Western states and/or to deflect criticism. Their assumptions can be applied to General
Nyamvumba’s first reason for Rwandan participation in peacekeeping. However, Rwandan
perception of state interest is different from the current literature. Instead of promoting state interest
through a secure regional neighborhood, these scholars suggest that Rwanda primarily participates
in peacekeeping for broad international and mostly Western states, such as the United States,
United Kingdom, and the European Union, for political or financial reasons. These assumptions
are problematic for Rwandan officials. Defence Minister, James Kabarebe, disagrees with this
explanation by illustrating how Rwandan troops are sent to nations close to or already experiencing
genocide rather than other missions that might be more favourable to the West. He explains: “if it
did (Rwanda participating in peacekeeping missions to satisfy global attention on conflict states
connected to Islamic terror), if Rwanda was just sending troops for foreign policy advantages,
then why have the RDF not sent troops to Somalia? Instead, the RDF sends troops when they fear
genocide is going to afflict a country.”85 Rwanda’s drive towards participation in peacekeeping
missions includes the desire to help prevent or stop other nation’s experiencing genocide. Secretary
General of National Intelligence and Security Services, General Joseph Nzabamwita, describes the
connection between Rwanda’s participation of peacekeeping with combating genocide, “With
the international community’s injustices in the past when it comes to Rwanda and peacekeeping
(UNAMIR’s inactions), Rwanda wanted to be different and challenge the narrative of what the UN
has done in the past without just criticism of the institution.”86 Nzabamwita’s mention of UNAMIR
connects directly with perceptions of how the Arusha Accord failed to protect Rwanda. The current
Rwandan government and military are, thus, still affected by the failure of the accords to promote
peace. This is best seen by how Rwanda does not want to abandon other states by allowing their
accords to fail.
Outcomes of Arusha in Burundi: Hardened Ideology, Ethnicity, and Cycles of Institutional Failure
Though flawed in implementation, Arusha was historically significant because of its attempts to
end violence on the ground in Burundi and create a system for post-civil war political and social
arrangements in Burundi. Two world-class mediators, Nelson Mandela and Julius Nyerere, played
key roles in including and engaging the CNDD-FDD in the negotiations, which ended up being
successful in the short-term to end the civil war. However, 15 years after the conclusion of the
Arusha negotiations in Burundi and the inclusion of the CNDD-FDD and Pierre Nkurunziza into
the official governmental sphere, respect for term limits and rule of law have gone awry. As was
seen in Rwanda in 1990-1994, genocidal rhetoric has resurfaced and daily massacres have resumed.
The goal is to use ethnic politics to motivate a young, frustrated, impoverished, and hopeless
population into the trenches of war to gain what the government cannot legitimately provide.87
Due to problems with the 2010 and now 2015 elections, the Arusha agreement has essentially
been replaced by a de facto one-party system. This has resulted in an end to most dialogue between
the opposition and the ruling party and has shifted the government into an authoritarian spiral
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where violence is used to wield power and legitimacy. Challenged by armed groups and criticized
by civil society and the international community, the government has resorted to repression and
intimidation.88
Institutional failure in Rwanda and Burundi also helps explain the deterioration of power
politics and ethnic manipulation into violence. Ndikumana writes that in Burundi, the failure
and ethnic politicization of key government institutions resulted in a divorce between state
institutions and the population.89 This meant that, although claiming to be a democratic regime,
institutions no longer represented the needs of the people, nor did they function in order to provide
sustainable livelihoods, protection against discrimination, economic opportunities, and positive
relations between citizens.90 In contrast, the ethnicization of political and government institutions
fueled dissatisfaction, mistrust, propaganda, and poverty among the Rwandan and Burundian
populations. Without faith in the strength of government institutions, a democracy cannot function
peacefully. Rwanda and Burundi are cases where this institutional failure led to violence and a lack
of stability.91
Uvin92 also discusses reliance on foreign and development aid as a factor that weakened
institutions. Reliance on foreign and development aid reduced institutional capacity and ownership.
It also negatively impacted the Rwandan and Burundian governments’ political will and desire to
meet citizens’ needs and become self-reliant. Dependence on development aid created a cycle that
demotivated both governments. They believed aid would replace institutional development and
local capacity. Foreign aid essentially served as a crutch for institutions, weakening their actual
ability and continuing to divorce them from the people.93
In addition, the desire to reach development goals was another factor that affected the strength
of institutions. In the 1980s and 1990s, as donor countries emerged from the Cold War period,
development aid became contingent on building democratic governments in East Africa. As many
institutions were already corrupt and based on ethnic proof of power, democratization was neither
a feasible or desirable option. Therefore, institutions attempted to develop according to democratic
standards, which included democratic elections and the de-ethnicization of government. In reality
however, the institutions were never truly democratized.94
Ndikumana writes specifically about institutional failure in Burundi, which was similar to
Rwanda. He says:
Because key institutions such as the military, the judiciary, and the education system are
controlled by ethnic and regional entities, the population feels alienated and disappointed
by the inability of the state to protect its rights and advance its interests. The ruling elite
has basically ‘privatized’ the state: through clientism, patronage, and rent seeking,
state institutions are used to accumulate wealth and to serve and protect the interests of
individuals and ethnic and regional entities. Violence is created and maintained in a vicious
cycle of frustration-claims and counterclaims-and repression as the rulers try to hold onto
power while the oppressed categories of the population claim for their fair share in national
resources.95

The failure of institutions resulted in the deterioration of the economy in both Rwanda and
Burundi, as they failed to build confidence and opportunity for citizens, and they were unable to
reduce risk, distribute wealth, and create job opportunities.96 According to international relations
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theory, the most fundamental role of institutions is to create and facilitate a system where social
exchange can exist without difficulty, ensuring that groups become better off economically
and livelihoods generally rather than worse.97 The second role is to provide stability within the
governmental system and economic and physical security. In Burundi and Rwanda, the failure
of the state was fueled by the privatization of goods and services, in addition to a system of
patronage. Specifically, in Rwanda, President Habyiramana, favored Hutu elites from Musanze,
his home region in the north, and manipulation began due to patronage occurring in his home
region. In Rwanda, Hutu elites, specifically under the Habyiramana regime, targeted Tutsi
civilians. There were quotas in universities, government jobs, and other sectors of society that
limited Tutsi participation and leadership. Propaganda and hate radio from Radio-Télévision Libre
des Milles Collines (RTLM) flourished under the Habyiramana regime. The RTLM linked the Tutsi
living in the country to the threat of the Rwandan Patriotic Front and Army, who launched failed
invasions into Rwanda from Uganda in 1990 and 1992.98 This clear discriminatory policy from the
Habyiramana party shows how institutions helped create structural and physical violence against
Tutsi citizens.
Discriminatory policies in Rwanda and Burundi were present in both governments throughout
the independence period. However, in Rwanda, structural and political violence was mainly
one-sided. There were some killings of Hutus, specifically by the RPA during their invasion,
however, politically, ideologically, and institutionally, there was clear, planned discrimination and
dehumanization of the Tutsi. In Burundi, the violence was more two-sided in nature, with conflict
fueling conflict between both sides. In both cases, however, power was maintained using violence.
This was due to the failure of institutions to provide fair and equal access to all citizens. This
analysis shows how institutional failure and a lack of democracy fueled and created a situation
where patronage politics based on ethnicity and regional ties prevailed over fair institutions, aimed
at aiding civilians.
Another key issue is the failure of the peacemakers to see the threat of genocide as the central
issue that underlies civil strife in both Burundi and Rwanda. The label ascribed to a violent episode
matters for the degree of attention paid, political will, and the level of international and regional
investment given to the country in the aftermath of violence. Threats of genocide are not the only
way to gain international clout, Commissions of Inquiry, investigations, and documenting human
rights violations can also raise awareness nd commitment to transitional peace. For example, Rene
Lemarchand claims:
The 1972 genocide in Burundi, like the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, is indeed the cataclysmic
event which lies at the root of the Hutu-Tutsi conflict. This is where the historical experience
of Burundi (and Rwanda) differs markedly from that of most other war-torn societies in
Africa. Dealing with ‘post-conflict’ situations is one thing; healing the wounds of genocide
is a very different matter.99

In terms of healing in countries traumatized by violence including ethnic cleansing and
genocide, it is important to recognize the difference between post-conflict and post-genocide
peacebuilding.
Indeed, in Rwanda, the international community, INGOs, the Rwandan government, and civil
society have treated the country’s experience as genocide. They have been sensitive to survivors’
needs as survivors of genocide, not only mass atrocities or conflict. However, in Burundi, the lack
of coherence among whether the 1972 and 1993 massacres were genocide has created a different
approach to peacebuilding. Rwanda has received much international attention, especially in terms
of international aid, development, post-genocide education, memorialization, reconciliation,
and peacebuilding programs. Burundi has not received such attention. Second, Rwanda has
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experienced more political stability than Burundi, stemming from the RPF government. This has
allowed survivors to feel secure living in Rwanda, for the most part. Third, Rwanda became an
experimental ground for transitional justice mechanisms after the genocide, and these efforts have
been subject to much research and monetary investment. Burundi has not experienced such a surge
of justice efforts, and it remains underdeveloped and in conflict today, when compared to Rwanda.
According to Lemarchand and Weissman:
Amazingly, the 1972 killings of Hutu by Tutsi-what Stephen Weissman calls ‘the first clear
genocide since the Holocaust’100 have sunk into near oblivion. The most obvious explanation
for this extra-ordinary case of historical amnesia is the conspiracy of silence which, to this
day, surrounds the circumstances of the killings, their scale, and their impact on subsequent
developments.101

Conclusion
The past and present conflicts in Rwanda and Burundi led to the formation of different Arusha
Accords with the singular desire to foster peace. However, both accords encountered difficulties
and failed to prevent mass atrocities including genocide and continued war. While Rwanda has
remained relatively stable under the RPF controlled Rwandan Government, Burundi has continued
to encounter violence. April 2017 has marked two years of preventable atrocities in Burundi. The
resurgence of violence has captured the lives of hundreds of innocent individuals, creating a
mass refugee problem, and threatening to further destabilize the Great Lakes region if no action
is taken. On April 25, 2015, the ruling CNDD-FDD announced that Pierre Nkurunziza would run
for a third term in the June 26, 2015 presidential election. The announcement sparked protests by
those opposed to Nkurunziza and those who claimed a third term would violate the country’s
constitution established at Arusha in 2005. The constitution states that no President can be elected
more than twice. In May 2015, Burundi’s Constitutional Court ruled in favor of Mr. Nkurunziza,
amid reports of judges being intimidated. Tens of thousands fled violence amid protests. In July
2015 Nkurunziza was reelected. The polls were disputed, with opposition leader Agathon Rwasa
describing them as “a joke.”102
Since December 2015 hundreds of individuals have been killed, and reports indicate that
murders occur on a daily basis. According to the UNHCR, over 402,158 refugees have escaped
to neighboring Rwanda, Tanzania, and Uganda, as of April 20, 2017.103 Michael Boyce of The East
African stated, “make no mistake: What keeps Burundi ‘quiet’ these days is not peace, but fear.
Cases of arbitrary arrests, torture, and disappearances are now on the rise – both in Bujumbura
and in rural areas.”104
Just as Arusha in Rwanda did not prevent the 1994 genocide against the Tutsis, Arusha in
Burundi has been reduced to a rhetorical and idealistic process that does not reflect the reality on
the ground today in Burundi. The ruling party controls institutions and has blocked all options
for power sharing, as stipulated in the ideals and conclusions of Arusha. Respect for rule of law
and human rights has completely broken down, with a resurgence of openly ethnic rhetoric and
propaganda encouraging youth militias to kill their neighbors to incite violence, which will help
the ruling party maintain political control. The question remains, at what cost?

100

Stephen R. Weissman, “Preventing Genocide in Burundi Lessons from International Diplomacy” (Washington, D.C.:
United States Institute for Peace, 1998).

101

Ibid.

102

British Broadcast Corporation. “Burundi’s Opposition Leader Rwasa Becomes Deputy Speaker,” BBC News, July 30,
2015, accessed October 26, 2018, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-33722209.

103

“Refugee Situations,” UNHCR, accessed April 21, 2017, https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/burundi.

104

Michael Boyce, “UN police presence in Burundi can make dialogue more attractive, violence more costly,” The East
African, May 7, 2016.

©2019

Genocide Studies and Prevention 13, no. 2 https://doi.org/10.5038/1911-9933.13.2.1696

Peace and Compromise, Idealism and Constraint

145

Bibliography
Beloff, Jonathan. “Lies we encounter when facing genocide denial.” Times of Israel (blog), October
2, 2014. Accessed November 3, 2016. http://blogs.timesofisrael.com/hitlers-jewishbackground-and- other-lies/.
Beswick, Danielle. “Peacekeeping, Regime Security and ‘African Solutions to African
Problems’: Exploring motivations for Rwanda’s involvement in Darfur.” Third World Quarterly 31,
no. 5 (2010), 739-754. DOI: 10.1080/01436597.2010.503566
----------. “The Risks of African Military Capacity Building: Lessons from Rwanda.” African Affairs
113, no. 451 (2014), 212-231. DOI: 10.1093/afraf/adu003
Bhavnani, Ravi and David Backer. “Localized Ethnic Conflict and Genocide Accounting for
Differences in Rwanda and Burundi.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 44, no. 3 (2000), 283-306.
DOI: 10.1177/0022002700044003001
Boyce, Michael. “UN police presence in Burundi can make dialogue more attractive, violence
more costly.” The East African, May 7, 2016. Accessed October 26, 2018. https://www.
theeastafrican.co.ke/OpEd/comment/-/434750/3194280/-/s5uxa3/-/index.html.
British Broadcast Corporation. “Burundi’s Opposition Leader Rwasa Becomes Deputy Speaker,”
BBC News, July 30, 2015. Accessed October 26, 2018. https://www.bbc.com/news/worldafrica-33722209.
Clark, Phil. “Must Academics Researching Authoritarian Regimes self-censor.” Times
Higher Education, November 28, 2013. Accessed November 1, 2016. https://www.
timeshighereducation.co.uk/features/must-academics-researching-authoritarian-regimesself-censor/2009275.fullarticle.
Corbin, Jane. “Rwanda’s untold story” BBC Two [Television series episode]. October 1, 2014.
Accessed November 3, 2016. http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b04kk03t.
Crisafulli, Patricia and Andrea Redmond. Rwanda, Inc.: How a devastated nation became an economic
model for the developing world. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012.
DOI: 10.1017/s0022278x13000311
Dallaire, Romeo. Shake Hands with the Devil: The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda. New York: Da Capo
Press, 2003. DOI: 10.3138/cjh.40.2.390
Ensign, Margee M. and William Bertrand. Rwanda: History and Hope. New York: University Press
of America, Inc, 2010.
Fisher, Jonathan. “Managing donor perceptions: Contextualizing Uganda’s 2007 intervention in
Somalia.” African Affairs 111, no. 444 (2012), 404-423. DOI: 10.1093/afraf/ads023
----------. “Structure, agency and Africa in the international system: Donor diplomacy and regional
security policy in East Africa since the 1990s.” Conflict, Security & Development 13, no. 5
(2013), 537-567. DOI: 14678802.2013.849471
Fujii, Lee Ann. Killing Neighbors: Webs of Violence in Rwanda. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2009.
DOI: 10.1017/s1537592709991095
Fukuyama, Francis. “Social Capital, Civil Society, and Development.” Third World Quarterly 22,
no.1 (2001), 7-20.
Gribbin, Robert. In the aftermath of genocide: The US role in Rwanda. Lincoln: iUniverse, 2005.
Guichaoua, Andre. From war to genocide: Criminal politics in Rwanda, 1990-1994. Madison: The
University of Wisconsin Press, 2015.
International Crisis Group, “Burundi: Bye-bye Arusha?” Report 192, October 25 2012. Accessed
October 26, 2018. https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/central-africa/burundi/burundi-byebye-arusha.
International Crisis Group. “Insights from the Burundian Crisis (III), Back to Arusha and the Politics
of Dialogue.” July 7 2016. Accessed October 26, 2018. https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/
central-africa/burundi/insights-burundian-crisis-iii-back-arusha-and-politics-dialogue.
Jackson, Robert and George Sorensen. Introduction to international relations: Theories and approaches,
2nd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003.
Jefremovas, Villia. “Treacherous Waters: The Politics of History and the Politics of Genocide in
Rwanda and Burundi.” Africa 70, no. 2 (2000), 298-308.
DOI: 10.3366/afr.2000.70.2.298

©2019

Genocide Studies and Prevention 13, no. 2 https://doi.org/10.5038/1911-9933.13.2.1696

Beloff & Lakin

146

Jessee, Erin, “Conducting Field Work.” Canadian Journal of Development Studies/Revue Canadienne
D’études Du Développement Publication Details 33, no. 2 (2012), 266-274.
DOI: 10.1080/02255189.2012.687356
Kimonyo, Jean-Paul.Rwanda’s popular genocide: A perfect storm. London, Lynne Rienner Publishers,
2016.
Kinzer, Stephen. A Thousand Hills, Rwanda’s Rebirth and the Man Who Dreamed It. Hoboken: John
Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2008. DOI: 10.1353/arw.0.0169
Krasner, Stephan. International regimes. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983.
Lemarchand, Rene. The Dynamics of Violence in Central Africa. Philadelphia: University of
Pennsylvania Press, 2009.
Mandani, Mahmood. When Victims Become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism, and the Genocide in Rwanda.
Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2001.
Melvern, Linda. A People Betrayed, the Role for the West in Rwanda’s Genocide. London: Zed Books,
2000.
Morgenthau, Hans, J. “Another Great Debate: The National Interest of the United States.” American
Political Science Review 46 (1954), 961-988. DOI: 10.2307/1952108
Nantulya, Paul.“Why the Arusha Accords Are Central,” Spotlight, Africa Center for Strategic
Studies, 2015. Accessed October 26, 2018. https://africacenter.org/spotlight/burundi-whythe-arusha-accords-are-central/.
Ndikumana, Léonce. “Institutional failure and ethnic conflicts in Burundi.” African Studies Review
41, no. 1 (1998), 29-47. DOI: 10.2307/524680
Newbury, Catherine and Newbury, David. “The Crisis in Rwanda.” African Studies Association 27,
no. 3 (1994), 9-11.
Pottier, Johan. Re-imagining Rwanda: Conflict, survival and disinformation in the late twentieth century.
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2002.
Prunier, Gerard. The Rwanda Crisis: History of a Genocide. New York: Columbia University Press,
1997.
----------. Africa’s World War Congo, The Rwandan Genocide, and the Making of a Continental Catastrophe.
New York: Oxford University Press, 2009.
“Refugee Situations.” UNHCR. Accessed April 21, 2017.
https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/burundi.
Reyntjens, Filip. “Rwanda ten years on: From genocide to dictatorship.” African Affairs 103, no. 411
(2004), 177-210. DOI: 10.1093/afraf/adh045
-----------. Political Governance in Post-Genocide Rwanda. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013.
Rusagara, Frank. “The spread of the ‘genocide ideology’ within the great lakes region:
Challenges for Rwanda.” In Rwanda Fast Forward: Social, Economic, Military, and Reconciliation
Prospects, edited by Maddalena Campioni and Patrick Noack, 213-227. New York: Palgrave
Macmillan, 2012.
Slim, Hugo. Review of On Complicity and Compromise by Chiara Lepora and Robert E. Goodin. Ethics &
International Affairs 27, no. 4 (2013). DOI: 10.1017/s0892679413000427
Straus, Scott and Lars Waldorf, eds. Remaking Rwanda: State Building and Human Rights After Mass
Violence. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2011. DOI: 10.3917/afco.240.0167
The Permanent Mission of Rwanda to the United Nations. “UN peacekeeping.” 2014. Accessed
November 3, 2016. http://rwandaun.org/site/un-peacekeeping.
Uvin, Peter. Aiding violence: the development enterprise in Rwanda. West Hartford: Kumarian Press,
Inc, 1998.
----------. “Ethnicity and Power in Burundi and Rwanda: Different Paths to Mass Violence.”
Comparative Politics (1999), 253-271. DOI: 10.2307/422339
----------. “Prejudice, Crisis, and Genocide in Rwanda.” African Studies Review 40, no. 2 (1997), 91115.
Waugh, Colin. Paul Kagame and Rwanda: Power, Genocide, and the Rwandan Patriotic Front. Jefferson:
McFarland & Company, Inc., 2004.
Weissman, Stephen R. Preventing Genocide in Burundi Lessons from International Diplomacy.
Washington, D.C.: United States Institute for Peace, 1998.

©2019

Genocide Studies and Prevention 13, no. 2 https://doi.org/10.5038/1911-9933.13.2.1696

Peace and Compromise, Idealism and Constraint

147

Zorbas, Eugene. “Aid dependence and policy independence: Explaining the Rwandan paradox.” In
Remaking Rwanda: State Building and Human Rights after Mass Violence, edited by Scott Straus
and Lars Waldorf, 103-117. Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 2011.
DOI: 10.3917/afco.240.0167

©2019

Genocide Studies and Prevention 13, no. 2 https://doi.org/10.5038/1911-9933.13.2.1696

